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Network dependence of strong reciprocity
R. Vilela Mendes∗†
Abstract
Experimental evidence suggests that human decisions involve a
mixture of self-interest and internalized social norms which cannot be
accounted for by the Nash equilibrium behavior of Homo Oeconomi-
cus. This led to the notion of strong reciprocity (or altruistic pun-
ishment) to capture the human trait leading an individual to punish
norm violators at a cost to himself.
For a population with small autonomous groups with collective
monitoring, the interplay of intra- and intergroup dynamics shows
this to be an adaptive trait, although not fully invasive of a selfish
population. However, the absence of collective monitoring in a larger
society changes the evolution dynamics. Clustering seems to be the
network parameter that controls maintenance and evolution of the
reciprocator trait.
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1 Homo oeconomicus versus homo recipro-
cans
The assumption of self-interest as a motivation for social and economic be-
havior is widely used as a guiding principle for social modeling. In a game
theory context the idea of maximization of self-interest leads to the notion of
(noncooperative) Nash equilibrium. A strategy is a Nash equilibrium if no
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player can improve his payoff by changing his strategy, when the strategies
of the other players are fixed.
Given any environment situation, in a Nash equilibrium solution, each
player tries to maximize his gains regardless of what happens to the other
players. It is the rational expectations attitude of what has been called
the Homo oeconomicus, a notion which is at the basis of many theoretical
economics constructions. Whether this is a realistic notion when applied to
human societies is an important issue. Experiments have been carried out
and, in many cases, when played by human players, games have outcomes
very different from the Nash equilibrium points. An interesting case is the
ultimatum game[1]. A simplified version of this game is the following:
One of the players (the proposer P ) receives 100 coins which he is told
to divide into two non-zero parts, one for himself and the other for the
other player (the responder R). If the responder accepts the split (R0), it is
implemented. If the responder refuses (R1), nothing is given to the players.
Consider, for example, a simple payoff matrix corresponding to two different
proposer offers (P0 and P1)
R0 R1
P0 a, c 0, 0
P1 b, b 0, 0
(1)
with a≫ c, a+ c = 2b (for example a = 99, c = 1, b = 50).
The unique Nash equilibrium is (P0, R0), corresponding to the payoffs
(a, c). However, when the game is played with human players, such greedy
proposals are most often refused, even in one-shot games where the responder
has no material or strategic advantage in refusing the offer. Based on this
and similar results in other situations (public goods games, etc), Bowles and
Gintis[2] [3] developed the notion of strong reciprocity (Homo reciprocans [4])
as a better model for human behavior. Homo reciprocans would come to
social situations with a propensity to cooperate and share but would respond
to selfish behavior on the part of others by retaliating, even at a cost to
himself and even when he could not expect any future personal gains from
such actions. This should be distinguished from cooperation in a repeated
game or reciprocal altruism or other forms of mutually beneficial cooperation
that can be accounted for in terms of self-interest.
The same authors, in collaboration with a group of anthropologists, con-
ducted a very interesting “ultimatum game experiment” in many small-scale
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societies around the world[5]. Homo oeconomicus is rejected in all cases and
consistently different results are obtained in different societies, the players’
behavior being strongly correlated with existing social norms and the mar-
ket structure in their societies. This and other experiments [6] [7] strongly
suggest that human decision problems involve a mixture of self-interest and
a background of (internalized) social norms [8] [9].
Strong reciprocity is a form of altruism [10] in that it benefits others at the
expense of the individual that exhibits this trait. Monitoring and punishing
selfish agents or norm violators is a costly (and dangerous) activity without
immediate direct benefit to the agent that performs it. It would be much
better to let others do it and to reap the social benefits without the costs.
Strong reciprocator agents contribute more to the group than selfish ones
and they sustain the cost of monitoring and punishing free-riders. For this
reason it was thought that the strong reciprocity trait could not invade a
population of self-interested agents, nor could it be maintained in a stable
population equilibrium. To counter this belief, Bowles and Gintis [3] devel-
oped a simple (mean-field type) model that might apply to the structure of
the small hunter-gatherer bands of the late Pleistocene. Taking the view that
the strong reciprocity trait has a genetic basis, this would be a period long
enough to account for a significant development in the modern human gene
distribution. The model would give an evolutionary explanation of the phe-
nomenon. Of course, if instead of gene-based, strong reciprocity is culturally
inherited, emergence and (or) modification of this trait could be much faster.
Because I intend to explore the influence of the social (network) structure
on the evolution of strong reciprocity, I will start by discussing a simplified
version of the Bowles-Gintis model. The main simplification is that migra-
tion in and out of the evolving group to an outside pool of agents is not
considered. The consideration of these migrations may be of interest for a
realistic picture of the hunter-gatherer bands of the Pleistocene, but not for
the general picture of strong reciprocity in a wider society. By simplifying
and somewhat enlarging the punishment scenario (beyond ostracism) of the
Bowles-Gintis model and framing it as a replicator one-dimensional map, a
clear view is obtained of its dynamical aspects.
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2 Emergence of strong reciprocity. The Bowles-
Gintis model
One considers a population of size N with two species of agents, one denoted
reciprocators (R-agents) and the other self-interested (S-agents). In a public
goods activity each agent can produce a maximum amount of goods q at
cost b (with goods and costs in fitness units). The benefit that an S-agent
takes from shirking public goods work is the cost of effort b (σ), σ being the
fraction of time the agent shirks. The following conditions hold
b (0) = b, b (1) = 0, b
′
(σ) < 0, b
′′
(σ) > 0 (2)
Furthermore q (1− σ) > b (σ) so that, at every level of effort, working helps
the group more than it hurts the worker.
For b (σ) one chooses
b (σ) =
2
2σ − 1 +
√
1 + 4/b
−
2
1 +
√
1 + 4/b
(3)
which satisfies the constraints (2).
R-agents never shirk and punish each free-rider at cost cσ, the cost being
shared by all R-agents. For an S-agent the estimated cost of being punished
is sσ, punishment being ostracism or some other fitness decreasing measure.
s is the weight given by an S-agent to the punishment probability. It may or
may not be the same as the actual fitness cost of punishment. Each S-agent
chooses σ (the shirking time fraction) to minimize the function
B (σ) = b (σ) + sfσ − q (1− σ)
1
N
(4)
f being the fraction of R-agents in the population, fσ is the probability of
being monitored and punished. The last term is the agent’s share of his own
production. The value σS that minimizes B (σ) is
σS = max

min

1
2
−
√
1
4
+
1
b
+
1√
sf + q
N
, 1

 , 0

 (5)
The contribution of each species to the population in the next time period
is proportional to its fitness given by
pi
′
S (f) = q (1− (1− f)σS)− b (σS)− γfσS
pi
′
R (f) = q (1− (1− f)σS)− b− c (1− f)
NσS
Nf
(6)
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for S- and R-agents. The baseline fitness is zero, that is, piS,R = max
(
pi
′
S,R, 0
)
.
The first term in both pi
′
S and pi
′
R is the benefit arising from the produced
public goods and the second term the work effort. The last terms represent
the fitness cost of punishment for S-agents and the cost incurred by R-agents.
γ = 1 corresponds to ostracism from the group, other values to gen-
eral coercive measures affecting the fitness of S-agents. The last term in pi
′
R
emphasizes the collective nature of the punishment. Notice however the im-
probable heavy punishing burden put on reciprocators when in small number.
Finally one obtains1 a one-dimensional map for the evolution of the frac-
tion of R-agents
fnew = f
ΠR (f)
(1− f)ΠS + fΠR (f)
(7)
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Figs. 1 and 2 display this map, as well as σS (f), ΠR (f) and ΠS (f) −
ΠR (f) for two different values of γ, the other parameters being the same.
They show the general behavior of the map in Eq.(7). If γ (the fitness impact
of punishment) is large enough, the map has an unstable fixed point A at
fA and a left-stable one B at fB. Between fB and 1 there is a continuum of
1Here replicator dynamics is used for the population evolution. Notice that Bowles and
Gintis[3] use a different (incremental) dynamics.
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marginally stable fixed points. For smaller γ the region between fA and fB
(where ΠS −ΠR is negative) disappears and only the marginally stable fixed
points remain. In both cases the asymptotic behavior corresponds either to
f = 0 (and σS = 1) or to f between 0 and 1 but σS = 0. That is, in this
second case, both reciprocators and shirkers remain in the population but
shirkers choose not to shirk because the minimum of B (σ) is at σS = 0.
For an initial f smaller than fA the fraction of reciprocators falls very
rapidly to zero. This reflects the (maybe unrealistic) fact that in this case
a very small number of reciprocators has to carry the burden of punishing
very many shirkers.
Hence, from the point of view of intragroup dynamics, either reciprocators
are completely eliminated from the population or they remain in equilibrium
with a probably large number of shirkers, which do not shirk for fear of being
punished. Therefore intragroup dynamics, by itself, cannot explain how the
reciprocator attitude might have become a dominant trait. However when
very many groups are considered, for example assembled at random from
a pool containing both reciprocators and shirkers [11] [12], then only the
groups that contain at the start a fraction f greater than fA will have in
the end a nonzero fitness. In all others, S-agents invade the population and
suffer a “tragedy of the commons” situation with final zero fitness. Therefore
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from an intergroup dynamics perspective the groups with reciprocators tend
to dominate and impose an above average predominance of the reciprocator
trait.
Although the model, together with intergroup dynamics, explains why
strong reciprocity is an adaptive trait [13], the marginally stable nature of the
(above fB) fixed points also suggest that the shirker trait is never eliminated
and will remain in the population.
Small independent groups assembling and disassembling is a likely sce-
nario for the development of the reciprocator trait. In this sense the hunter-
gatherer bands of the Pleistocene might have indeed provided the appropriate
environment for the evolution of the trait, whether gene-coded or culturally-
inherited.
It is well known that group size affects monitoring in public goods pro-
vision [14]. Therefore, a natural question is what happens when, later on,
the Pleistocene reciprocators and their fellow shirkers become imbedded into
a larger society. Monitoring and punishment of shirkers by reciprocators
necessarily looses its global collective nature. Once monitoring looses its
global nature, it becomes the business of the neighbors of the shirker. In
addition to the individual cost of monitoring and (or) punishing free-riders,
such punishing requires an amount of force that, in particular, insures the
effectiveness of the punishment and on the other hand puts the punisher safe
from direct retaliation from the violator. This is one of the reasons for the
creation of central authorities for this purpose. However if central authorities
have enough force to implement punishment without retaliation, they are at
times quite ineffective at monitoring. Also laws and central authorities, on
the role of reciprocators play, a role in the control of serious offenses, but
not so much on the day to day monitoring of public goods work. Therefore
in a large society the nature of the control performed by the neighbors is
certainly going to play a role on the evolution of the reciprocator trait.
If the trait is genetically encoded, maybe the wider societies developed
by modern man had no time to make significant changes on its structure.
However if it is (at least in part) culturally inherited then a much shorter time
scale may be involved. What about the big city tales of a guy being mugged
in full daylight while a crowd of passersby moves along quite indifferent to
the event? Is it the (1− f) remnants of non-reciprocators in the population
or are we watching the emergence of Homo Oeconomicus in his full glory?
Or is it something else?
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3 Network dependence of strong reciprocity
To explore the possible effect of the social network structure on the evolution
of strong reciprocity I will consider a agent-based model, which later on will
be interpreted in a mean field sense similar to the model in Section 2.
As before one considers R-agents and S-agents and the monitoring func-
tion performed by R-agents is kept at the neighbors level. However punish-
ment is only implemented if at least two neighbors are willing to do so. It is
the same as to say that punishing a norm-violator cannot be an individual
action, but requires a minimal social power and consensus. The need to be
close to monitor and the need for agreement of at least two neighboring recip-
rocators to implement punishment, immediately suggests that the structure
of the network is going to play a role on the evolution of the group. The
following is the mathematical coding of this idea:
As before one has two agent species (S-agents and R-agents), the frac-
tion of R-agents being f . The agents are placed in a network where, on
average, each agent is connected to k other agents. k is called the degree
of the network. To the whole population of dimension N one associates 3
N−dimensional vectors, Wk, Pu, Cpu. Wk is called the work vector, Pu
the punishment vector and Cpu the cost of punishment vector.
The link structure of the network is chosen as in the β−model of Watts
and Strogatz[15] [16]. Starting from a regular ring structure where each node
is symmetrically connected to its k closest neighbors, each link is examined
in turn and, with probability β, replaced by a random link to some other
node in the network.
At time zero, fN R-agents and (1− f)N S-agents are placed at random
in the network. The local neighborhood of agent i, that is the set of other
agents connected to i, is denoted Γi. The entries of the vectorsWk, Pu, Cpu
are then computed as follows:
# For the Wk vector
R-agents; Wk (i) = 1
S-agents; Wk (i) = nR(i)
k
, where nR (i) is the number of R-agents con-
nected to this S-agent, nR (i) = # {j : j ∈ R, j ∈ Γi}
# For the Pu vector
R-agents; Pu (i) = 0
S-agents; Pu (i) = nP (i) (1−Wk (i)), where nP (i) is the number of
pairs of R-agents in Γi which are also neighbors among themselves, nP (i) =
8
# {(j, k) : (j, k) ∈ R, (j, k) ∈ Γi, j ∈ Γk} and (1−Wk (i)) is the shirking frac-
tion.
# For the Cpu vector
R-agents; Cpu (i) =
∑
k∈S nC (i, k) (1−Wk (k)) where nC (i, k) is the
number of times that the agent i is in a R-pair punishing an S-agent k,
nC (i, k) = # {(i, j) : k ∈ S, (i, j) ∈ R, (i, j) ∈ Γk, j ∈ Γi}
S-agents; Cpu (i) = 0
Summarizing:
Each reciprocator, on detecting an S-agent k, looks for another reciproca-
tor in his own neighborhood also connected to k. If he finds one he punishes
k by an amount proportional to the fraction of shirking. An S-agent may be
punished several times by all different pairs of reciprocators in his neighbor-
hood.
The amount of work that an S-agent does is inversely proportional to the
number of reciprocators in his neighborhood. However lack of communication
between neighboring reciprocators may make the probability of punishment
much smaller.
The (average) fitness of R-agents and S-agents is
pi
′
R =
q
N
∑
all
Wk (i)−
b
fN
∑
i∈R
Wk (i)−
c
fN
∑
i∈R
Cpu (i) (8)
pi
′
S =
q
N
∑
all
Wk (i)−
b
(1− f)N
∑
i∈S
Wk (i)−
γ
(1− f)N
∑
i∈S
Pu (i) (9)
The baseline fitness is zero, that is
piR,S = max
(
pi
′
R,S, 0
)
(10)
Once the fitness is computed the replicator equation
fnew = f
piR
fpiR + (1− f) piS
(11)
is applied and a new cycle starts with a new random distribution, on the
network, of Nfnew R-agents and N (1− fnew) S-agents.
Running this agent model for several values of β and, in each case, for
random initial f0’s one finds two separate regions in the (f0, β) plane (Fig.3).
In region 1 the evolution drives f towards zero as well as the overall fitness
pi (Example in Fig.4a)
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Figure 3:
pi = fpiR + (1− f) piS (12)
In region 2 there is an asymptotic nonzero value for f and for the fitness
(Example in Fig.4b).
As β increases it becomes less likely to have a stable nonzero f . the
origin of this effect is clear. Although β−rewiring maintains the average
degree of the network, the probability of two neighbors of an agent to be
themselves neighbors decreases. Therefore it becomes increasingly difficult
for reciprocators to find local consensus for the punishment of S-agents.
The average probability of two R-neighbors of a network node in S to be
themselves neighbors, is called the (relative) clustering coefficient,
CR =
nP (i)(
# {Γi ∩R}
2
) (13)
(
# {Γi ∩ R}
2
)
being the maximum possible number of links between the
R-neighbors of S-agent i. The network clustering coefficient is related to the
notion of transitivity used in the sociological literature.
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For the β−rewiring model, the clustering may be estimated from the
number Φ of shortcuts which in this case is proportional to β [16].
Cβ (Φ, k) =
3
4
(1− Φ)2
(
k − 2
3
)
− (1− Φ)
k − 1
(14)
Therefore a mean field version of the agent model may be written as follows
Π
′
R = q (1− (1− f)σS (f))− b (σS (f))− γfCβ (Φ, fk) σS (f) (15)
Π
′
S = q (1− (1− f)σS (f))− b− c (1− f)
fk
2
Cβ (Φ, fk) σS (f) (16)
Notice the term fk in Cβ (Φ, fk) and in the cost of punishment term in
Π
′
S. It reflects the fact that neighborhood relations for reciprocators are to
computed on their subnetwork of size fN .
b (σ) is as in Eq.(3) with σS being computed to minimize
B (σ) = b (σ) + sfCβ (Φ, fk) σ − q (1− σ)
1
N
(17)
This mean field version gives results identical to the agent-based model.
Clustering appears therefore as the determining network parameter driving
the evolution of the reciprocator trait.
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4 Conclusions
1 - With a structure of small groups with collective monitoring of the agents’
activities, the fitness difference between groups with a sizable amount of
reciprocators and those where they have disappeared, makes the emergence
of the strong reciprocity trait a likely event.
However rather than being completely invaded by reciprocators, mainte-
nance of a certain amount of self-interested types is also likely, which only
cooperate for fear of being punished. If, at a later stage, the social structure
changes, they may be a source of instability and invade the population.
2 - In a large population, monitoring of the public goods behavior of the
agents cannot be a fully collective activity, rather being the chore of those in
close contact with the free-riders. Punishment of free-riders also requires a
certain amount of local consensus among reciprocators. Therefore the clus-
tering nature of the society may play an important role in the maintenance
and evolution of the reciprocator trait.
Maybe the indifferent passersby that let the poor guy be mugged are
not yet homo oeconomicus. Maybe they are just reciprocators in the middle
of strangers with whom they do not communicate nor trust. A clustering
problem.
3 - Culturally-inherited traits may have a much faster dynamics than
gene-based ones. Modern societies are “small worlds” in the sense of short
path lengths but not necessarily in the sense of also maintaining a high degree
of clustering. Therefore if the reciprocator trait has a high cultural compo-
nent, it may very well happen that, eventually, we will see homo oeconomicus
leaving the benches of economy classes for a life on the streets.
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